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Article 
Asylum’s Interpretative Impasse:  
Interpreting “Persecution” and “Particular Social 
Group” Using International Human Rights Law 
Nicholas R. Bednar and Margaret Penland 
Abstract 
The United States is in the midst of two crises: an 
overwhelming number of refugees seeking asylum in the United 
States and an interpretive impasse. Who is a “refugee”? As the 
Board of Immigration Appeals tightens its interpretation of 
“refugee” amidst the United States’ latest refugee crisis, 
practitioners must utilize every available tool at their disposal to 
advance their client’s asylum claims. This Article guides 
practitioners on when and how to use international human rights 
law arguments in emerging types of asylum claims, particularly 
those of child applicants and those based on domestic violence. 
To create a holistic picture, this Article considers the following: 
(1) current interpretations of the definition of “refugee” under 
United States law; (2) the incorporation of international human 
rights law in United States domestic law; (3) sources of 
international human rights law that may aid in advancing 
interpretative arguments; and (4) how practitioners can 
effectively use these sources in legal arguments. 
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Introduction 
The United States is in the midst of two crises: a refugee 
crisis and an interpretative impasse. In 2013, U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol (“CBP”) apprehended 38,833 unaccompanied 
minors, primarily from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Mexico.1 In addition to these unaccompanied minors, thousands 
of women have fled to the United States to escape gang violence 
and domestic abuse in their home countries. In 2013, CBP 
apprehended 36,174 adults who expressed a fear of returning to 
their countries of origin, up from 5,369 in 2009.2 Many of these 
refugees have experienced domestic violence, child abuse, and 
gang-related violence in their countries of origin. Fortunately, 
many nonprofit organizations attempt to provide these refugees 
with pro bono counsel to file for asylum.3 Unfortunately, current 
interpretations of the definition of “refugee” make it difficult for 
practitioners to convince adjudicators of the validity of their 
claims. 
To prevail on an asylum claim, an applicant must establish 
that he or she is a “refugee” as defined by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 101(a)(42)(a) defines a “refugee” 
as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of, that country because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion . . . .4 
 
1. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN 
ON THE RUN 16 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background
/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html. 
 2. See id. at 4. 
 3. See, e.g., Jill Bachelder, Advocates for Human Rights Establishes 
National Asylum Hotline, THE JOURNAL (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.journal
mpls.com/news/2015/08/advocates-for-human-rights-establishes-national-
asylum-hotline/. We do not mean to suggest that the need for attorneys in the 
immigration context is easily met. It is not. Much could be done to increase 
reputation of at-risk immigrant groups in asylum and removal proceedings. 
What programs and changes to the immigration system could better facilitate 
representation of refugees is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
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The basic elements of an asylum claim are derived from this 
definition, which Congress adopted in the Refugee Act of 1980 
(the “1980 Refugee Act”). An asylum applicant must show he or 
she is (1) unable or unwilling to return to their home country, (2) 
because of persecution, (3) by the government or someone the 
government cannot or will not control, (4) on account of, (5) “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”5 
The 1980 Refugee Act derives its definition of refugee from 
the 1951 Refugee Convention (“Refugee Convention”) and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “1967 
Protocol”).6 Neither the 1980 Refugee Act nor the international 
treaties upon which it is based define “persecution” or 
“particular social group.”7 Therefore, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”), and federal courts have interpreted these undefined 
terms. Practitioners can use international human rights 
treaties, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee 
(“UNHCR”) guidelines, and sister signatories’ case law as 
interpretive tools to support various asylum claims. 
Recent case law interpreting “refugee,” however, has not 
been friendly to asylum seekers.8 What, then, can persuade an 
adjudicator to accept an applicant’s proposed interpretation of 
“persecution,” “particular social group,” or other ambiguous 
 
 5. See id. In addition to the above criteria, an asylum applicant must show 
that he or she is applying within one year of arriving in the United States and 
is not barred under INA § 208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). These criteria, 
however, are not related to the definition of “refugee” and this Article does not 
explore them. 
 6. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012), with Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force 
Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention], and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee 
Protocol]. The definitions of the 1980 Refugee Act and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention vary slightly, though any variation is seemingly insignificant in 
asylum adjudications. For reference, the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a 
refugee as any person who: “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.” Refugee Convention art. 1. 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 
6; Refugee Protocol art. 1, supra note 6. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
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terms included in the 1980 Refugee Act?9 Practitioners should 
utilize every possible tool at their disposal to convince asylum 
adjudicators to accept their interpretations of “refugee.” In one 
of its most influential decisions, Matter of Acosta, the BIA 
acknowledged that “it is appropriate for [adjudicators] to 
consider various international interpretations of [the Refugee 
Convention]” in construing the elements of “refugee.”10 This 
Article expands upon the general guidance found in Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ case law and guides practitioners on when 
and how to use international human rights law arguments in 
emerging types of asylum claims. 
Part I of this Article explains how Congress incorporated the 
1951 Refugee Convention and its subsequent 1967 Protocol into 
the 1980 Refugee Act. Next, it explains how the BIA and circuit 
courts have subsequently interpreted the 1980 Refugee Act. Part 
II surveys the incorporation of international law into United 
States domestic law and suggests that while international 
human rights law is rarely binding unless incorporated into 
United States domestic law, practitioners may persuade judges 
to use international human rights law in interpreting the 
various pieces of the 1980 Refugee Act’s definition of “refugee.” 
Part III explores various instruments of international law, their 
interpretations, and the ways in which practitioners can use 
these instruments in international human rights arguments. To 
do this, Part III examines UNHCR materials, human rights 
treaties, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (“GA 
Resolution”), and foreign case law. 
This Article concludes with Part IV, where we apply 
international human rights law to two fictional cases. Part IV(A) 
analyzes a hypothetical case of a Salvadoran woman fleeing from 
her abusive boyfriend. Part IV(B) applies our arguments to a 
fourteen-year-old Salvadoran child fleeing gang violence. Both of 
these sections provide a roadmap for practitioners to follow in 
making their own international human rights law arguments. 
 
 9. This question was initially prompted to the University of Minnesota 
Immigration and Human Rights Clinic by Advocates for Human Rights, a non-
profit that finds pro bono attorneys for asylum seekers in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. This Article is our response to that question. 
 10. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 220 (B.I.A. 2004) (overruled in 
part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that 
Matter of Acosta’s “clear probability” and “well-founded fear” standards are not 
meaningfully different, and therefore that portion of Matter of Acosta is 
overruled)). 
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I. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF 
THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE 
1967 PROTOCOL IN UNITED STATES 
DOMESTIC LAW 
To understand how international human rights law can be 
used to expand interpretations of the definition of “refugee,” it is 
first necessary to explain how the United States immigration 
system currently interprets the term. Part I(A) examines the 
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of “refugee” 
in the 1980 Refugee Act, and concludes that the interpretation 
of these sources of law has been left to the BIA and United States 
courts. Part I(B) surveys how the BIA and United States courts 
have interpreted the 1980 Refugee Act. In particular, Part I(B) 
addresses two key terms: “particular social group” and 
“persecution.” Both Part I(B)(i) and Part I(B)(ii) conclude that 
the standards and interpretations provided by the BIA are too 
ambiguous and vague, leaving ample room for practitioners to 
utilize international human rights arguments in asylum claims. 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 1951 REFUGEE 
CONVENTION, THE 1967 PROTOCOL, AND THE 1980 
REFUGEE ACT 
Prior to World War II, no internationally accepted definition 
of “refugee” existed.11 In light of the significant number of 
displaced persons after the war, however, the United Nations 
convened “a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva . . . to 
consider an international agreement to provide legal protection 
to refugees.”12 As a result, the 1951 Refugee Convention adopted 
the first internationally recognized definition of “refugee” 13: 
 
 11. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based 
on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 505, 506 (1993) (“The early international agreements related to 
refugees tended to focus on particular refugee groups, such as Russians, 
Armenians, or, even more specifically, German refugees from the Saar.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 12. Id. at 508 (“The 1951 Convention, which has been signed by 109 
governments to date, was the first international compact to adopt a universal 
refugee definition, rather than one tied to a particular national or ethnic 
group.”). 
 13. See Daniel J. Steinblock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 733, 739 (1998). 
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As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.14 
The Refugee Convention, however, restricted the refugee 
definition “both temporally and geographically.”15 As described 
within the treaty, the individual must have been displaced 
“before 1 January 1951.”16 Furthermore, the displacement must 
have occurred as a “result of events” occurring before the 
enumerated date, granting refugee status only to individuals in 
a geographical area affected by the war.17 The 1967 Protocol 
removed the temporal and geographical restrictions, creating a 
universally applicable definition of “refugee.”18 
The United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, 
but has signed the 1967 Protocol.19 As discussed more 
thoroughly in Part II, the Refugee Convention is a non-self-
executing treaty and is binding on the United States only to the 
extent that Congress has incorporated it into domestic law.20 
The only language from either the 1967 Protocol or the Refugee 
Convention that Congress has incorporated in the 1980 Refugee 
Act is the definition of “refugee”: 
 
 14. Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6. 
 15. See Steinblock, supra note 13, at 739. As the refugee definition reveals, 
the Convention initially only covered individuals who were persecuted before 
January 1, 1951 “as a result of” the events of World War II. See Refugee 
Convention art. 1, supra note 6. 
 16. Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Steinblock, supra note 13, at 739; see also Refugee Protocol art. 1, 
supra note 6 (stating that a refugee is “any person within the definition of article 
I of the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 . . . ‘ and the words ‘ . . . as a result of such events’, in article I A 
(2) were omitted’”). 
 19. See Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6; see also Refugee Protocol 
art. 1, supra note 6. 
 20. Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 584 n.8 (A.G. 2003). 
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[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of, that country because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion . . . .21 
Thus, the United States is not bound by any other articles 
of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, the United States is bound 
by the refugee definition as Congress defined it, not as it has 
been interpreted by other foreign authorities. As such, the BIA 
and United States courts are the primary interpreters of the 
1980 Refugee Act.22 Given the difficult task of interpreting the 
broad definition of “refugee,” UNHCR documents and foreign 
case law—while only non-binding, persuasive authority—may 
provide guidance to the BIA and United States courts. 
B. INTERPRETATION OF “REFUGEE” BY UNITED STATES 
COURTS 
The ambiguity of the 1980 Refugee Act leaves space for 
expansive interpretation by the BIA and United States courts. 
This section covers the two of the most ambiguous—and 
therefore two of the most contested—terms: “particular social 
group” and “persecution.” 
1. Interpreting “Particular Social Group”23 
In 1986, the BIA interpreted the phrase “particular social 
group” for the first time in Matter of Acosta.24 Using the 
 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). Compare id., with Refugee Convention 
art. 1, supra note 6, and Refugee Protocol art. 1, supra note 6. The variation 
between refugee definitions of the 1980 Refugee Act and 1951 Refugee 
Convention does not matter for purposes of interpretation. 
 22. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–33 (applying the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis to the definition of “refugee” in order to interpret “particular 
social group”). 
 23. For more on the “particular social group standard,” its evolution, and 
the struggles it presents to practitioners, see Nicholas R. Bednar, Social Group 
Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social 
Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355 (2015). 
 24. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
152 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
interpretative canon of ejusdem generis,25 the BIA created an 
“immutable characteristic” standard to evaluate whether or not 
the asylum applicant articulated a valid “particular social 
group.” To satisfy the immutable characteristic standard, 
members of the proposed particular social group must share a 
characteristic “that either is beyond the power of an individual 
to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience 
that it ought not be required to be changed.”26 Under this 
standard, the BIA and circuit courts have accepted broad 
particular social groups, including those defined by 
homosexuality,27 forced marriage,28 ethnicity,29 and a variety of 
other immutable characteristics.30 
The majority of federal circuits embraced the Acosta 
standard, and for nearly two decades it remained the primary 
test for determining the validity of a particular social group.31 In 
2002, following the promulgation of a different interpretation of 
 
 25. Ejusdem generis is a textual canon employed by courts to interpret 
general terms using the specific terms surrounding the general term as context. 
See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
 26. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at. 233. For a more thorough analysis 
of the Acosta standard, see IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW 
SOURCEBOOK 622–28 (14th ed. 2014), and REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER 
50–58 (6th ed. 2010). 
 27. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 
1990). 
 28. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 29. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding Bihari living in Bangladesh to be a particular social group); Ali v. 
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 784–87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding gang-rape of asylum 
seeker was on account of her membership in the Midgan clan of Somalia); 
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding Bulgarian 
national of Roma descent constituted a particular social group). 
 30. See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 510–12 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that parents of Burmese student dissidents constituted a particular social 
group); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35–36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in 
fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and 
immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”). For a substantial 
list of additional cases finding the existence of a particular social group, see 
KURZBAN, supra note 26, at 622–28. 
 31. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. INS, 
144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 
(1st Cir. 1990). But see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574–75 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (adopting the “voluntary associational relationship” test). Since 
Sanchez-Truijllo, the Ninth Circuit has shifted more towards the Acosta 
standard. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(overruled by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 2006) (cert. granted, 
judgment vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)). 
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“particular social group” by Australia, the UNHCR proposed a 
uniform definition in its 2002 Guidelines on International 
Protection: 
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are 
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will 
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is 
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the 
exercise of one’s human rights.32 
The UNHCR’s uniform definition attempted to merge Acosta’s 
immutable characteristic test and Australia’s social visibility 
test by allowing the refugee to prove either to establish the 
existence of a particular social group. 
Following the publication of the UNHCR Guidelines, in 
2006 the BIA reinterpreted “particular social group” to include 
the elements of “social visibility” and “particularity” in addition 
to an immutable characteristic.33In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA 
articulated its understanding of these elements. The BIA 
defined the test for particularity as “whether the proposed 
description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to 
create a benchmark for determining group membership.’”34 To 
satisfy the element of social visibility, the applicant must show 
that his or her particular social group is “recognizable by others 
in the community . . . considered in the context of the country of 
concern and the persecution feared.”35 The BIA did not adopt 
alternative immutable characteristic or social visibility tests as 
suggested by the UNHCR Guidelines but rather required the 
refugee to prove that the particular social group shared an 
immutable characteristic, was socially visible, and was defined 
with particularity. 
In two more recent cases, Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of 
W-G-R-, the BIA clarified its interpretation of particularity and 
social visibility. According to the BIA, the purpose of 
 
 32. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (2008) (citing the UNHCR 
guidelines). 
 33. See generally Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957–61 (B.I.A. 2006) 
(discussing whether “noncriminal informants” or “noncriminal drug informants 
working against the Cali drug cartel” are valid particular social groups in the 
context of that case). 
 34. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing Davila-
Mejia v. Mukasey, No. 07-2567, 2008 WL 2630085, at *3 (8th Cir. July 7, 2008)). 
 35. Id. at 586–87. 
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particularity is to allow the adjudicator to clearly identify who is 
and who is not a group member.36 Therefore, the particular 
social group must “be discrete and have definable boundaries—
it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”37 In 
addition, the BIA renamed “social visibility” as “social 
distinction” in order to alleviate confusion and explain that 
“[l]iteral or ‘ocular’ visibility is not . . . a prerequisite.”38 Social 
distinction requires a particular social group to “be perceived as 
a group by society,” not just the persecutor.39 The BIA 
acknowledged some overlap between the elements of 
particularity and social distinction but noted that particularity 
addresses the “‘outer limits’ of a group’s boundaries,” while social 
distinction addresses whether “society would perceive a 
proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct.”40 
The BIA and circuit courts use particularity and social 
distinction to deny asylum to individuals from Central America, 
whose particular social groups allegedly cannot meet these 
criteria. In particular, the BIA has yet to accept particular social 
groups involving gangs or drug cartels. In Matter of C-A-, the 
BIA concluded that a particular social group of “noncriminal 
informants” was “too loosely defined.” 41 Similarly, in Matter of 
M-E-V-G-, the BIA rejected the particular social group of 
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but 
who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”42 In 
Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA denied asylum to an applicant 
claiming persecution as a member of the particular social group 
defined as “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador 
who have renounced their gang membership.”43 Circuit court 
precedent has also illustrated a hesitation to accept gang-based 
asylum claims.44 Despite its unwillingness to accept these 
 
 36. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (“A 
particular social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear 
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”). 
 37. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 38. Id. at 238. The Seventh Circuit had rejected the criterion of “social 
visibility,” believing that applicants could only satisfy social visibility by 
“pinning a target to their backs.” See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th 
Cir. 2009). 
 39. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240. 
 40. Id. at 241 (citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 
2003)). 
 41. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957. 
 42. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228. 
 43. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209. 
 44. See, e.g., De Leon-Saj v. Holder, No. 13-60898, 583 F. App’x 429, 430 
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particular social groups, the BIA continues to affirm that these 
decisions are not a “blanket rejection of all factual scenarios 
involving gangs.”45 
Particular social groups defined in part by sex have had 
more success. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA case to uphold 
a particular social group since the inception of particularity and 
social visibility, the BIA accepted “married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social 
group.46 In Paloka v. Holder the Second Circuit remanded to the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) an application involving a particular 
social group defined as “unmarried young women in Albania,” 
implying that the particular social group was valid.47 Many sex-
based particular social groups, however, remain untested and 
there has yet to be a BIA or circuit court decision examining 
sexual violence in a gang context. 
Plenty of other scholars and advocates have acknowledged 
the potential constitutional and international law issues brought 
by particularity and social distinction.48 Indeed, the National 
Immigrant Justice Center declares that particularity “effectively 
precludes the use of common parlance labels to describe a 
[particular social group], even as the social distinction test 
requires that a [particular social group] be limited by 
parameters a society would recognize.”49 The purpose of this 
Article is not to explore those claims. Rather, this Article hopes 
to illustrate how practitioners may use international human 
rights law to persuade justices that their particular social group 
is protected under the 1980 Refugee Act. 
 
(5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2014) (rejecting “students in Guatemala targeted by gangs”). 
Note that per the Fifth Circuit’s rules of Appellate Procedure, this unpublished 
opinion may not be used as precedent except in limited circumstances. 
 45. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 251. 
 46. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 47. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 48. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association and the Central American Resource Center in Support of Petitioner 
at 5–7, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-71571); 
Bednar, supra note 23, at 380–86; Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- 
and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular 
Social Group,” 14-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 19 (2014). 
 49. Nat’l Immigrant Just. Ctr., Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: 
Applying for Asylum After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- 3 (2014), 
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/PSG%20Practice%
20Advisory%20and%20Appendices-Final-1.22.16.pdf. 
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2. Interpreting “Persecution” 
Like “particular social group,” the 1980 Refugee Act does not 
define the term “persecution,” but rather leaves its 
interpretation to the BIA and federal courts. Matter of Acosta 
serves as a starting point for the interpretation of “persecution.” 
First, relying in part on the UNHCR Handbook, the BIA 
concluded that the applicant must establish that her “primary 
motivation for requesting refuge in the United States is ‘fear,’ 
i.e., a genuine apprehension or awareness of danger in another 
country.”50 Examining its case law prior to the enactment of the 
1980 Refugee Act, the BIA defined persecution as “a threat to 
life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, 
those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.”51 The BIA 
created a two-part test from this definition: (1) the “harm or 
suffering had to be inflicted upon an individual in order to 
punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor 
sought to overcome;”52 and (2) the “harm or suffering had to be 
inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or 
an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to 
control.”53 Matter of Acosta, however, says little about what 
types of harm would constitute persecution: “[t]he harm or 
suffering inflicted could consist of confinement or torture,”54 
“[the harm] could consist of economic deprivation or restrictions 
so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or 
freedom,”55 and “[g]enerally harsh conditions shared by many 
other persons did not amount to persecution.”56 
Since Matter of Acosta, the BIA and circuit courts have 
continued to refine the definition of persecution. A single 
incident of persecution may be sufficient,57 but the adjudicator 
 
 50. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 221. 
 51. Id. at 222 (citing Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); Matter 
of Maccaud, 14 I. & N. Dec. 429, 434 (B.I.A. 1973) (additional citations omitted)). 
 52. Id. (quoting Matter of Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199, 204 (B.I.A. 1963)). 
 53. Id. (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(additional citations omitted)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1961)). 
 55. Id. (quoting Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1962) 
(additional citations omitted)). 
 56. Id. (quoting Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968)). 
 57. See generally Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that a single incident of persecution is not outside of the legal definition 
of “persecution” for asylum claims). 
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should examine multiple instances of harm cumulatively.58 
Persecution does not require that the harm result in permanent 
or serious injuries,59 and may include emotional or psychological 
harm, as opposed to physical harm.60 At the same time, the harm 
must “rise above unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic 
suffering.”61 Additionally, persecution does not include mere 
discrimination.62 While many of the BIA’s past cases “involved 
actors who had a subjective intent to punish their victims . . . 
this subjective ‘punitive’ or ‘malignant’ intent is not required for 
harm to constitute persecution.”63 
In some respects, the forms of harm that constitute 
persecution are obvious. For example, in Gomes v. Gonzales, the 
Seventh Circuit found persecution where Muslim 
fundamentalists harmed Catholics in Bangladesh by severely 
beating them, threatening them with knives, and murdering 
their Catholic relatives.64 Severe forms of often gender-based 
harm such as rape,65 female genital mutilation (“FGM”),66 and 
forced marriage similarly constitute persecution.67 
Unlike “particular social group,” Congress has also stepped 
in to broaden the definition of “persecution.” In 1996 Congress 
modified the definition of “refugee” to include: 
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or 
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has 
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a 
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population 
 
 58. See, e.g., Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 59. See Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 60. See Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Jorgi v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson v. 
INS, 232 F. 3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 62. Matter of A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 739–40 (B.I.A. 2005). 
 63. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing Matter 
of Kulle, 19 I. & N. Dec. 318 (B.I.A. 1985); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 
222–23. 
 64. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 752–57 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 65. See Lopez-Galarza v. INS., 99 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ape and 
physical abuse at the hands of Sandinista military officers, coupled with her 
imprisonment, food deprivation, and forced labor, satisfies the definition of 
‘persecution.’”). 
 66. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365; Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 
513, 517–518 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 67. See, e.g., Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 996 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that the right to marry is fundamental and persecution in the form 
of forced marriage may lead to the formation of a valid particular social group). 
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control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of a political opinion, and a 
person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be 
forced to undergo such a procedure or [be] subject 
to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance 
shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of political opinion.68 
Congress therefore recognizes the existence of gender-specific 
persecution, at least in the context of forced sterilization and 
abortion. 
While death threats and severe physical violence rise above 
the level of harassment or discrimination, other forms of 
persecution remain subject to reinterpretation and conflicting 
case law. For example, Matter of Acosta established that 
economic deprivation in some cases may be persecution but left 
open the question of when deprivation is “severe” enough to rise 
above generally “harsh conditions.”69 In an effort to clarify its 
understanding of economic persecution, in Matter of T-Z-, the 
BIA elaborated that the deprivation must be the “deliberate 
imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of 
liberty, food, housing, employment, or other essentials of life,”70 
but the resulting economic difficulties must be “above and 
beyond” those shared by others in the country.71 Yet, what 
specific facts illustrate a sufficiently severe deprivation is 
unclear. Practitioners representing unaccompanied minors may 
wish to use economic deprivation as a basis for persecution, but 
will need alternative sources to advance a compelling 
interpretation.72 
Other forms of persecution relevant to the United States’ 
current refugee crisis may also require novel interpretations. 
 
 68. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), revised under the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 69. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222 (citing Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 
386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967) (citations omitted)). 
 70. See Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 163 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 71. See id. at 170–74. 
 72. See, e.g., Brief of Kids in Need of Defense as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, Feb. 20, 2015, Matter of Z-T-, __ I & N ___ (BIA 2015), 
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04
/KIND_Amicus_Brief_Feb_2015-1.pdf (discussing the severe economic 
deprivation a child would endure if sent back to Honduras); see generally 
Jonathan L. Falkler, Economic Mistreatment as Persecution in Asylum Claims: 
Towards a Consistent Standard, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 471 (2007) 
(describing the standards for economic deprivation under asylum law). 
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Practitioners may be able to persuade adjudicators that forms of 
harm such as forced gang recruitment, domestic violence, child 
abuse, and child abandonment amount to persecution in certain 
cases. Arriving at these interpretations, however, will require 
resorting to authority beyond current U.S. case law. 
International human rights law offers one way of buttressing 
novel interpretations of the refugee definition. 
II. INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 
United States courts must respect international law that 
has a binding effect on the United States. Unfortunately, 
however, the United States is bound only to those international 
human rights treaties that are self-executing or are incorporated 
into domestic law through ratification by the Senate. As such, 
most sources of international human rights law are persuasive 
authority only.73 According to scholar David Cole: 
[I]nternational human rights feel aspirational, without 
the force of law. It is not surprising then, that 
international human rights arguments are rarely 
advanced in domestic U.S. courts—in immigration cases 
or elsewhere. Nor should it be surprising that in those 
few instances where such arguments are broached, they 
are as often as not ignored or summarily dismissed.74 
Generally, United States judges are reluctant to cite to 
international law, and international human rights law in 
particular. Indeed, the late Justice Scalia once referred to 
international human rights law as a “brooding omnipresence in 
the sky.”75 As judges are already averse to relying on 
international law in their opinions, they may grow tired of 
 
 73. Cf. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseung, 525 U.S. 155, 176 
(1999) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 389, 404 (1985)) (“The ‘opinions of 
our sister signatories’ . . . are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–40 (1987) (recognizing the value of the 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
in interpreting the definition of “refugee”). 
 74. David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human rights and Immigrants’ 
Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 629 (2006). 
 75. William S. Dodge, Justice Scalia on Foreign Law and the Constitution, 
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 22, 2006), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/02/22/justice-scalia-on-
foreign-law-and-the-constitution/. 
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frequent citations to international human rights treaties and 
foreign sources if practitioners use them carelessly. With these 
caveats in mind, attorneys may use treaties, along with other 
interpretive sources available from United Nations’ bodies, 
NGOs, and foreign immigration authorities, to advance 
international human rights arguments in United States 
jurisdictions. 
Countries incorporate international law into their domestic 
law in a variety of ways. Scholars define the way countries view 
treaties vis-à-vis national law under one of two main concepts: 
monism or dualism. In a simplistic monist state, international 
law is automatically incorporated into domestic law.76 
Importantly, the legislature, executive, and judicial branches of 
a monist state are obligated to give effect to international law 
over domestic law in cases of conflict.77 In comparison, in a 
simplistic dualist state, international law and domestic law 
remain two separate authorities that “govern different actors 
and issues.”78 Unlike monist states, dualist states selectively 
choose whether and how specific instruments of international 
law will be incorporated into domestic law.79 In reality, states 
tend to fall along a spectrum of monist and dualist policies, as 
opposed to simply accepting a form of pure monism or dualism.80 
The United States is no exception. Article VI of the United 
States Constitution states that both “the Laws of the United 
States” and treaties shall be “supreme Law of the Land.”81 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
importance of adherence to international law. Under The 
Charming Betsy doctrine, a canon of statutory interpretation 
derived from an early Supreme Court case, domestic law is to be 
interpreted to avoid conflicts with international law.82 Ralph G. 
Steinhardt argues that The Charming Betsy doctrine is a 
 
 76. See JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, 
AND PROCESS 243–44 (3d ed. 2010). 
 77. See id. at 245 (stating that the Netherlands is an example of a monist 
state). See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 17 
(1986) (“[W]hen someone in Holland feels his human rights are being violated 
he can to a Dutch judge and the judge must apply the law of the convention. He 
must apply international law even if it is not in conformity with Dutch law.”). 
 78. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 244. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 82. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 66–69 (1804). 
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reflection of the appreciation of monist values in United States 
jurisprudence.83 
Treaty interpretation in the United States has been 
influenced by both monism and dualism.84 The Supreme Court 
has recognized self-executing treaties—treaties that do not 
require implementation by Congress into domestic law—as 
binding where the treaty is unambiguous and requires only 
judicial implementation.85 The incorporation of self-executing 
treaties into domestic law is a reflection of the monist view of 
international law at work in the United States legal system. For 
example, the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Franklin Mint Corporation concluded that the Warsaw 
Convention, an international air carriage treaty that sets a limit 
on an air carrier’s liability for lost cargo, is a self-executing 
treaty.86 But treaties can also be non-self-executing, requiring 
Congress to implement the terms of the treaty by statute. As 
such, treaties fall along a spectrum of dualist (non-self-executing 
treaties) and monist (self-executing treaties) approaches to 
international law. United States diplomats negotiate human 
rights treaties as non-self-executing, requiring legislative 
adoption of the treaty into domestic law for the treaty to gain 
binding effect.87 Courts are reluctant to read self-executing 
language into these human rights treaties.88 Even if the Senate 
ratifies a human rights treaty, the United States typically 
 
 83. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of 
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (1990) (“The 
monist view of international law in domestic courts similarly denies that 
international conduct or emerging norms of law can be relevant only if 
recognized and adopted by Congress.”). 
 84. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward 
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 
638–39 (2007). 
 85. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); see also United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (“[I]f, as respondent asserts, [the 
treaty] is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf 
of an individual . . . .”). 
 86. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 
(1984) (“[T]he Convention is a self-executing treaty. Though the Convention 
permits individual signatories to convert liability limits into national currencies 
by legislation or otherwise, no domestic legislation is required to give the 
Convention the force of law in the United States.”). 
 87. Waters, supra note 84, at 639. 
 88. See, e.g. White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 440 n.2 (finding the language 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention 
Against Torture did not permit a reading of the treaties as self-executing); Sei 
Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721–25 (1952) (holding that the U.N. Charter 
was not self-executing). 
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includes enough reservations to prevent the treaty from 
“altering domestic law.”89 For example, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft made it explicitly clear that the Refugee Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol are not self-executing treaties and 
therefore do not have the force of law.90 The BIA has also held 
that only the provisions of the 1967 Protocol and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights incorporated into domestic law by 
statute are binding in United States immigration proceedings.91 
In short, practitioners must understand the relative authority of 
international human rights treaties in United States domestic 
law and be careful not to overstate the binding authority of 
international law. 
III. SOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Human rights treaties and their interpretations can be used 
to buttress asylum claims. As discussed in Part II, courts are 
unlikely to cite to international human rights law in support of 
a decision. Treaties, U.N. reports, and foreign authorities can, 
however, demonstrate to an adjudicator the prominence and 
viability of a particular interpretation of the refugee definition 
and help persuade a court to rule in favor of an asylum applicant. 
This section analyzes various instruments of international law 
and provides examples as to which of these or similar 
instruments have been recognized by federal courts, the BIA, 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies. 
A. UNHCR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION 
UNHCR guidelines are among the most practical sources 
that practitioners can cite when interpreting the 1980 Refugee 
Act. As the UNHCR is the United Nations administrative body 
for the Refugee Convention, adjudicators tend to defer more 
readily to its interpretations. Article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention requires contracting states “to cooperate with the 
 
 89. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 
129, 172 (1999). 
 90. Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 584 n.8. 
 91. Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 507–08 (B.I.A. 1987). 
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Office of the [UNHCR], or any other agency of the United 
Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, 
and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the 
application of the provisions of this Convention.”92 Article 35 of 
the Refugee Convention, however, has not been incorporated 
into domestic law and therefore the United States is not bound 
by UNHCR interpretations of the Refugee Convention.. 
Regardless, UNHCR materials remain a great source of 
interpretative guidance. 
The UNHCR publishes two types of materials—a handbook 
and various guidelines—each of which interpret provisions of 
the Refugee Convention. It is important to remember, however, 
that UNHCR guidelines are merely persuasive authority and 
their interpretations are therefore not binding on the United 
States. As the Supreme Court stated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca: 
We do not suggest, of course, that the explanation in the 
U.N. Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds 
the [United States] with reference to the asylum 
provisions of § 208(a) . . . . Nonetheless, the Handbook 
[and Guidelines] provide[] significant guidance in 
construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to 
conform.93 
The BIA, IJs, USCIS, and appellate courts use the UNHCR 
Handbook and guidelines to interpret the 1980 Refugee Act.94 
The United States Supreme Court has used the UNHCR 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status in interpreting the definition of “refugee.”95 In INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court cited the UNHCR 
Handbook to adopt a broad definition of “well-founded fear” that 
 
 92. Refugee Convention art. 35, supra note 6. 
 93. INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987). 
 94. See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586 (referring to the 2002 
Guidelines of the UNHCR to mandate the requirement of social visibility); 
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (“The recent Guidelines 
issued by the United Nations confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element 
in identifying the existence of a particular social group.”); Asylum Officer Basic 
Training, Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov
/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum
/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-Related-
Claims-31aug10.pdf (citing UNHCR gender-based claims “[r]ecognizing the 
particular vulnerability of women”). 
 95. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438–39. 
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benefited the applicant. In Mohammed v. Gonzales, the Ninth 
Circuit quoted the 2002 UNHCR’s Guidelines on International 
Protection: Membership of a Particular Social Group, noting that 
“women may constitute a particular social group under certain 
circumstances based on the common characteristic of sex, 
whether or not they associate with one another based on that 
shared characteristic.”96 Similarly, USCIS training materials 
defer substantially to UNHCR interpretations in determining 
how to analyze gender-based asylum claims.97 
Yet the BIA has not always adhered faithfully to UNHCR 
interpretations, even when using UNHCR materials as 
persuasive authority. In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA cited the 
UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of 
a Particular Social Group in justifying its adoption of the “social 
visibility” requirement.98 Scholars have suggested that this 
interpretation of the UNHCR Guidelines obscures the UNHCR’s 
original intention to create alternative “immutability” and 
“social visibility” tests, as opposed to one test possessing both 
requirements.99 In Matter of Thomas, the UNHCR filed an 
amicus brief in opposition to “social visibility,” claiming that 
“[t]he UNHCR would caution the board against adopting such a 
rigid approach which may disregard groups that the Convention 
is designed to protect.”100 The BIA’s interpretation of “social 
visibility” shows that the BIA considers the UNHCR Handbook 
persuasive, but does not automatically adopt the UNHCR’s 
interpretation of the handbook. The risk of unfavorable 
precedent, however, should not dissuade practitioners from 
using the UNHCR guidelines in support of their arguments. 
 
 96. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of a Particular 
Social Group, at 4, U.N. Doc. (HCR/GIP/02/02, (May 7, 2002)). 
 97. See Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note 
94. 
 98. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586. Since S-E-G-, the BIA has 
replaced “social visibility” with “social distinction.” See generally Matter of M-
E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236. 
 99. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” 
in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum 
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 70–71 (2008) 
(comparing the BIA’s “social visibility” interpretation to the UNHCR 
Guidelines); see also Casper, supra note 48, at 1–2, 19–22. 
 100. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees as Amici Curiae at 10, Matter of Thomas, No. A75-597-033 (2007), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45c34c244.pdf. 
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When arguing gender-based asylum claims, practitioners 
should consider citing to the UNHCR’s Guidelines on 
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution.101 These 
guidelines are helpful in cases involving domestic violence, rape, 
sexual violence, or other gender-based persecution. Paragraph 
nine is particularly germane: 
While female and male applicants may be subjected to 
the same forms of harm, they may also face forms of 
persecution specific to their sex. International human 
rights law and international criminal law clearly identify 
certain acts as violations of these laws, such as sexual 
violence, and support their characterization as serious 
abuses, amounting to persecution. In this sense, 
international law can assist decision-makers to 
determine the persecutory nature of a particular act. 
There is no doubt that rape and other forms of gender-
related violence, such as dowry-related violence, female 
genital mutilation, domestic violence, and trafficking, 
are acts which inflict severe pain and suffering – both 
mental and physical – and which have been used as 
forms of persecution, whether perpetrated by State or 
private actors.102 
This paragraph supports the argument that adjudicators must 
look to international law when identifying whether or not 
gender-based violence is persecutory. Following paragraph nine, 
the guidelines proceed to analyze specific common incidents of 
gender-based persecution and particular social groups (e.g. 
prostitutes and homosexuals).103 
The guidelines further suggest that, in addition to 
particular social group arguments, practitioners should evaluate 
potential political opinion arguments in gender-based asylum 
claims.104 The UNHCR acknowledges that “[t]he image of a 
political refugee as someone who is fleeing persecution for his or 
her direct involvement in political activity does not always 
correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in some 
 
 101. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related 
Persecution, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, (May 7, 2002). 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. Id. at 3–11. 
 104. Id. at 8–9. 
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societies.”105 Persecutors may impute women with the “political 
opinions of their family or male relatives.”106 Women may also 
engage in political activity by refusing “to engage in certain 
activities, such as providing meals to government soldiers.”107 In 
many circumstances, an imputed political opinion claim may be 
more applicable than a claim based on a gender-oriented 
particular social group. Of course, in other circumstances, an 
applicant may be able to establish a more direct political opinion 
through overt feminist activism.108 
For practitioners representing children in asylum claims, 
the UNHCR has also published Guidelines on International 
Protection: Child Asylum Claims. In these guidelines, the 
UNHCR encourages “[a] child-sensitive application of the 
refugee definition,” as would be consistent with the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of Child (“CRC”).109 The UNHCR 
indicates that the CRC requires adjudicators to consider the 
“best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning children.”110 As discussed below in Section 
B(ii), the CRC has not been ratified by the United States. As 
such, when citing to these guidelines, practitioners should be 
careful that the suggested interpretation is not dependent on the 
CRC. Regardless, practitioners may find these guidelines helpful 
in framing arguments for asylum claims regarding underage 
recruitment, child trafficking and labor, female genital 
mutilation, domestic violence, and other child-specific forms of 
persecution. In particular, these guidelines may be useful in 
suggesting that any of these acts constitute persecution. 
  
 
 105. Id. at 8. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241–42 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a 
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in question is so profound that she 
would choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance, her beliefs 
may well be characterized as ‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience that 
[they] ought not be required to be changed.’ (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. at. 234)). 
 109. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims, 
at 4, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08, (Dec. 22, 2009). 
 110. Id. 
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B. TREATIES 
Most human rights treaties are not self-executing and have 
not been incorporated into domestic law. There is a plethora of 
human rights treaties that, though not binding, can still be used 
as persuasive authority in domestic violence-based asylum 
claims and asylum claims involving children. This section will 
discuss three such treaties: the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”); the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 
1. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women was signed by the United States 
on July 17, 1980, but has not been ratified.111 It is the leading 
international covenant addressing gender-based human rights 
violations. Article 1 defines discrimination against women very 
broadly as 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the 
basis of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field.112  
CEDAW also established the Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW 
Committee”) to provide interpretive guidance and 
recommendations.113 Numerous provisions of CEDAW grant 
expansive protection to women, and the CEDAW Committee’s 
 
 111. See Luisa Blanchfield, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Issues in the U.S. 
Ratification Debate, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, at 1 (June 28, 2011), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40750.pdf. 
 112. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) 
[hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 113. Id. arts. 17, 21. 
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interpretations of these provisions may be relevant to gender-
based asylum claims.114 The CEDAW Committee’s General 
Recommendations No. 32 and No. 14 provide the most relevant 
and specific support for domestic violence-based asylum claims. 
General Recommendation No. 32—”the gender related 
dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality, and stateless 
women”—published in November of 2014, specifically addresses 
gender-based asylum claims.115. The CEDAW Committee makes 
clear that one of the purposes of General Recommendation No. 
32 is to provide guidance to states on how to address gender 
discrimination in order to fulfill the rights of asylum-seeking 
women.116 The Committee also states that it intends for its 
interpretation to fit within the existing international law 
framework, comprised of other treaties that relate to asylum-
seeking women, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Refugee Convention.117 This Recommendation 
contains two particularly useful provisions. 
The first is from General Recommendation No. 32 is 
paragraph 15, where the CEDAW Committee states that 
“gender-related forms of persecution” may include: 
[T]he threat of female genital mutilation, forced/early 
marriage, threat of violence and/or so-called “honour 
crimes,” trafficking in women, acid attacks, rape and 
other forms of sexual assault, serious forms of domestic 
violence, the imposition of the death penalty or other 
physical punishments existing in discriminatory justice 
systems, forced sterilization, political or religious 
 
 114. See id. arts. 2, 3, 5, 9; see also Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 12: Violence 
against Women, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989), http://www.un.org/womenwatch
/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom12 (declaring that States 
must protect women from “violence of any kind occurring within the 
family. . . or in any other area of social life”); Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence 
against Women, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), http://www.un.org/women
watch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19 (“Gender-based 
violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to 
enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”). 
 115. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 32: On the Gender-Related Dimensions of Refugee Status, 
Asylum, Nationality, and Stateless Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/32 (Nov. 
14, 2014), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/627/90/PDF
/N1462790.pdf?OpenElement. 
 116. Id. at para. 4. 
 117. Id. at paras. 5, 9. 
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persecution for holding feminist or other views and the 
persecutory consequences of failing to conform to gender-
prescribed social norms and mores, or for claiming their 
rights under the Convention.118 
Practitioners may cite to paragraph 15 to support the assertion 
that these various forms of domestic violence constitute 
“persecution” for purposes of the Refugee Convention and are 
thus a valid and recognized basis for asylum. 
Additionally, in paragraph 13, the CEDAW Committee 
states that the purpose of Recommendation No. 32 is to ensure 
the application of “a gender perspective when interpreting all 
five grounds [for asylum], and [the] use [of] gender as a factor in 
recognizing membership in a particular social group. . . .”119 
Practitioners can use this statement to bolster the argument 
that asylum claims founded on gender-based domestic violence 
satisfy the “immutability” requirement for particular social 
group claims, because gender is an immutable characteristic.120 
Paragraph 13 also encourages adjudicators to take a gender-
based perspective with all asylum claims, not only for “particular 
social group” claims. A practitioner might cite to this paragraph 
when explaining how an asylum claim that does not appear to 
be related to gender is gender-based. For example, the asylum 
claim of a female who has been targeted by Salvadoran gangs 
may be dismissed by an adjudicator as a gang-related claim, 
which has been held, on its own, to not qualify as a ground for 
asylum. However, explaining that there is a gendered 
component to the targeting of females in Salvadoran gang 
culture, as opposed to in male recruitment cases, could support 
a particular social group or political opinion claim. 
Another useful General Recommendation from the CEDAW 
Committee is General Recommendation No. 14.121 This 
Recommendation addresses female genital mutilation.122 
 
 118. Id. at para. 15 
 119. Id. at para. 13. 
 120. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 392–94 (holding that an applicant 
for asylum seeking relief based on membership in a particular social group must 
establish that the group is “(1) composed of members who share a common 
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 
within the society in question). 
 121. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, U.N. Doc. A/45/38 and 
Corrigendum (1990), http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a30.html. 
 122. Id. 
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Though Recommendation No. 14 does not explicitly say that 
FGM is persecution,123 it has been cited in both federal court and 
BIA cases in support of this conclusion. In Abay v. Ashcroft, the 
Sixth Circuit cited General Recommendation No. 14 to support 
the conclusion that FGM is a recognized violation of women’s 
and female children’s rights, and constitutes persecution.124 
Recommendation No. 14 was also referenced in Abankwah v. 
INS, again as evidence that FGM is an internationally 
recognized crime rising to the level of persecution.125 
More generally, evidence that practitioners have 
successfully cited to General Recommendations indicates a 
willingness on the part of federal courts and the BIA to consider 
non-binding international law when deciding various claims. 
The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations No. 32 
and No. 14 themselves provide support for establishing that 
various forms of domestic violence rise to the level of 
persecution, that gender may be used to satisfy the immutability 
requirement in PSG claims, and that FGM is persecution. In 
addition to the Recommendations discussed here, CEDAW and 
other CEDAW Committee materials may also support general 
claims about the prevalence of gender-related domestic violence, 
and how it affects asylum seekers.126 
2. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes and 
grants broad protection to children’s fundamental rights.127 
With 140 signatories, the CRC is the most widely ratified treaty 
in history.128 The United States signed the CRC on February 16, 
 
 123. Id. The text of General Recommendation No. 14 recognizes that “the 
practice of female circumcision and other traditional practices [that are] 
harmful to the health of women” and recommends various methods by which 
States can combat FGM and other harmful practices. 
 124. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 125. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 126. Though a comprehensive list of such resources is beyond the scope of 
this article, the Committee’s website offers numerous resources, including 
annual reports and general recommendations. See UNHCR, Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, http://www.ohchr.org/en
/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx 
 127. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [hereinafter CRC]. 
 128. UNICEF and the CRC, Convention on the Rights of the Child, A World 
of Difference: 25 CRC Achievements, UNICEF (last updated June 18, 2014), 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_73549.html. 
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1995, but has not ratified it and the United States Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected the theory that the pervasive 
ratification of the CRC elevated the treaty to a manifestation of 
customary international law.129 
Though the CRC has gained unprecedented global 
acceptance, this treaty remains non-binding on the United 
States. However, it remains persuasive authority for United 
States courts, the BIA, and asylum officers. There are many 
ways that the CRC can be used to support children’s asylum 
claims, including the use of Articles 12 and 22. Under United 
States law, children often receive refugee or asylee status as 
derivatives of a parent’s application.130 The CRC, however, 
recognizes that children are independent individuals that are 
entitled to rights and protections separate from their parents.131 
Article 12 requires that parties allow a child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views and respect the right of the child 
to express those views freely in all matters affecting that 
child.132 Article 22 represents an important provision in the 
context of an asylum claim for a child, stating: 
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure 
that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is 
considered a refugee in accordance with applicable 
international or domestic law and procedures shall, 
whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her 
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate 
protection and humanitarian assistance in the 
enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present 
Convention and in other international human rights or 
humanitarian instruments to which the said States are 
Parties.133 
Thus, the CRC broadly recognizes that children are 
independently entitled to rights and protections, and specifically 
points out that this entitlement extends to the right to 
independently apply for asylum. 
 
 129. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 621–23 (2005) (stating that the 
failure of the United States to ratify the CRC indicates a lack of national 
consensus on the issue). 
 130. See INA, § 208(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2014). 
 131. CRC, supra note 127, art. 12. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. art. 22. 
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Some provisions in the CRC may be helpful in making 
arguments regarding the definition of “persecution” as it relates 
to children. Article 36 broadly requires that state parties 
“protect the child against all other forms of exploitation 
prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare.”134 Article 37 
states that children should be protected from “torture” and 
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”135 There is additional 
support in the CRC that recruitment of children by armed 
groups constitutes “persecution.”136 Article 38 requires states to 
ensure that children younger than fifteen “do not take a direct 
part in hostilities.”137 These provisions suggest that the 
recruitment of children to take part in armed violence as well as 
the torture or exploitation of children by armed groups may 
qualify as “persecution.” 
Other provisions of the CRC support the assertion that 
children, who among themselves have a shared experience, 
constitute a “particular social group.” The CRC supports this 
assertion by advocating for the notion that children are 
independent legal agents entitled to their own rights and 
protections. The independent rights of children, for example, are 
recognized by Articles 12 and 22. In addition, many CRC 
provisions demonstrate the distinct right of children to seek 
rights and protection under the law.138 Recognizing children as 
independent and autonomous beings entitled to rights and 
protections supports the argument that children are socially 
distinct. This, in turn, reemphasizes that children constitute a 
“particular social group.” One can argue, therefore, that children 
recruited by armed groups would qualify as refugees under the 
“particular social group” category based on their age at the time 
of recruitment and their shared experiences of abduction, 
torture, and escape. 
 
 134. Id. art. 36. 
 135. Id. art. 37. 
 136. Id. art. 38. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children. . . the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”); id. art. 8 (“States 
Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality. . . .”); id. art.12 (“States Parties shall assure to the child 
who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child. . . .”); id. art. 24 (“States Parties 
recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health. . . .”); id. art. 28 (“States Parties recognize the right of the 
child to education. . . .”). 
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3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
a broad human rights treaty signed and ratified by the United 
States.139 As a result, the ICCPR might provide strong support 
for asylum claims. In reality, however, it is only binding to the 
extent that Congress incorporates it into domestic law.140 In 
practice, the ICCPR has not proven to be influential or useful in 
most asylum claims.141 Nonetheless, there are a number of 
relevant and useful provisions in this treaty that should not be 
overlooked, specifically those provisions that assist in 
interpreting “particular social group” or “persecution.” 
The ICCPR includes a number of general provisions useful 
in interpreting the definition of “particular social group.” Article 
2 requires that states respect individuals of any “race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”142 While the 
refugee definition in United States law explicitly protects many 
of these groups, others—such as property status or sex—are not 
included in the definition. Practitioners can use Article 2 to 
suggest that the “particular social group” category is intended to 
protect these other groups. Article 3, which requires that states 
“undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women” further 
supports construing “particular social group” to include sex.143 
Article 24 of the ICCPR explicitly protects children, suggesting 
that they too may be a protected “particular social group.”144 
Furthermore, practitioners can utilize the ICCPR to 
construe “persecution.” Among other things, the ICCPR 
prohibits depriving an individual of life,145 torture or “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”146 slavery,147 
 
 139. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Exec. Rep. 102–23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 140. Cf. Sloss, supra note 89, at 171–72. 
 141. DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRANT DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, AND 
POLITICS 166 (2012) (noting that the ICCPR has a lack of influence on detention 
practices in the U.S., most of Europe, and Australia) (“[R]epresents an 
unusually clear failure of the international human rights system as a tool of 
legal and political change.”). 
 142. ICCPR, supra note 139, art. 2(1). 
 143. Id. art. 3. 
 144. Id. art. 24. 
 145. Id. art. 6. 
 146. Id. art. 7. 
 147. Id. art. 8. 
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arbitrary arrest or detention,148 and restricting freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.149 Article 23 is particularly 
pertinent in gender-based and domestic violence claims, 
requiring “free and full consent” of individuals seeking to 
marry.150 Forced marriage may therefore qualify as persecution. 
Additionally, Article 23(4) states that parties must “take 
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and 
responsibilities of spouses.”151 Practitioners may use this 
provision to suggest domestic violence is persecution, especially 
when the government is unwilling to intervene or pass laws 
criminalizing domestic violence. 
C. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS—THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Arguably, the single most influential U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution is the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (“UDHR”).152 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the 
UDHR on December 10, 1948 as a non-binding resolution, laying 
out the basic human rights to which all individuals are 
entitled.153 Since its adoption, the UDHR has gained prominence 
as the fundamental international instrument on basic human 
rights.154 
The UDHR gave rise to several human rights treaties, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).155 In addition, the Preamble to the 
Refugee Convention specifically references the UDHR.156 Many 
 
 148. Id. art. 9. 
 149. Id. art. 18; see id. art. 19, 22, 25. 
 150. Id. art. 23. 
 151. Id. art. 23(4). 
 152. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 153. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 410–11. 
 154. Id. at 416 (“After the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration is often 
considered to be the most influential international instrument of the twentieth 
century.”). 
 155. Id. at 410 (“[G]overnments intended the Universal Declaration to serve 
principally as an intermediate step toward the preparation of a binding 
international human rights treaty, delays in the preparation of the two 
subsequent International Covenants left the Universal Declaration for many 
years as the primary and most heavily invoked international human rights 
instrument.”). 
 156. Refugee Convention, supra note 6 (referencing the UDHR in the 
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scholars believe that the UDHR has been so influential, and has 
been cited and utilized so often by both international and 
domestic law, that it has been partially elevated and 
transformed into binding customary international law.157 
The United States was a major proponent of the UDHR and 
voted for its adoption in the General Assembly in 1948.158 Since 
its adoption, United States courts have cited to the UDHR 
extensively,159 including in an array of asylum cases.160 When 
compared with other international instruments, the UDHR has 
been referenced—and even relied on—more than most, if not all, 
other international sources.161 Despite the influential role the 
UDHR has played in United States case law, the BIA has held 
that in asylum cases, the provisions of the UDHR are only 
binding if they have been specifically adopted into United States 
law.162 Nevertheless, due to its exalted status in international 
law and the extensive reference to the UDHR in United States 
case law, adjudicators of asylum cases may be more open to 
UDHR-supported arguments. Specifically, its provisions may be 
cited as interpretive support in defining “particular social group” 
and “persecution” within the context of domestic violence-based 
asylum claims. 
Article 2 grants “all of the rights and freedom set forth in 
[the] Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
 
beginning of the Preamble). 
 157. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 416 (“The UDHR has been cited 
with approval in countless successor treaties, declarations, and resolutions by 
the United Nations and regional organizations, and many of its provisions have 
been incorporated into the constitutions and laws of individual states. At least 
some of its provisions are now part of customary international law.”). 
 158. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 
Sixty: Is It Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 254 
(2008). 
 159. See id. at 272 (explaining that the author found 238 reported federal 
and state cases from 1948 to October 1, 2007, that referred to the Universal 
Declaration). 
 160. See, e.g., Zheng v. Gonzales, 192 Fed. App’x 733 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 161. See Cheng, supra note 158, at 288 (pointing out that though the UDHR 
has had “marginal impact on U.S. law”, this instrument has had influence over 
certain areas of the law that “is therefore not an achievement critics should 
belittle or ignore.”). 
 162. Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 508. It is also important to note that 
some commentators and judges have interpreted the Supreme Court case, Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, as holding that the UDHR is not a binding source of 
international law. See Cheng, supra note 158, at 274. 
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. . . sex” to everyone.163 Article 14 of the UDHR further provides 
that individuals have a “right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.”164 Read together, these 
provisions support the assertion that asylum adjudicators 
should take a gender-based perspective when considering 
asylum claims, especially particular social group and political 
opinion claims.165 These provisions also support the argument 
that sex should be protected under the “particular social group” 
category within the refugee definition.166 
The UDHR can also be used to help define “persecution.” 
Like the ICCPR, the UDHR contains provisions that protect 
basic human rights, which can be used to interpret the meaning 
of “persecution.” Article 3 protects individuals’ right to “life, 
liberty, and security of person.”167 Article 4 requires that no 
individual be subjected to “slavery or servitude.”168 The right to 
be free from torture and degrading treatment is protected by 
Article 5,169 while a person’s right to “leave any country, 
including his [or her] own . . . .” is granted by Article 13.170 
Importantly for domestic-violence-based claims, Article 16 
protects individuals’ right to marry, but also the right to consent 
to marriage.171 All of these provisions of the UDHR—and more—
can be cited in support of the assertion that deprivation of these 
rights constitutes “persecution” for the purposes of asylum. 
D. SISTER SIGNATORIES’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
In addition to the interpretive tools discussed above, the 
inclusion of foreign cases and interpretations of treaties can 
support a specific interpretation of the refugee definition under 
United States law.172 Practitioners can utilize foreign case law 
 
 163. UDHR, supra note 152, art. 2. 
 164. Id. art. 14. 
 165. See Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note 
94, at 16–17. 
 166. Id. at 27. 
 167. UDHR, supra note 152, art. 3. 
 168. Id. art. 4. 
 169. Id. art. 5. 
 170. Id. art. 13. 
 171. Id. art. 16. 
 172. See generally Fatma Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. 
Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 391 (2013) (analyzing the role 
of foreign authorities in United States asylum adjudication). From a policy 
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and agency manuals to show an interpretative pattern among 
sister signatories. This is particularly true in cases where an 
issue has been scarcely analyzed by United States adjudicators, 
including various human rights issues. Practitioners must be 
careful, however, to select only the most persuasive foreign 
authorities. Use of foreign authorities by courts may result in 
the adoption of the more restrictive or inappropriate asylum 
policies of other nations by United States adjudicators.173 By 
including international human rights arguments in asylum 
claims, however, practitioners can facilitate the adoption of a 
shared understanding of international human rights law by 
those countries that are bound to follow it. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that when 
interpreting a treaty, “the ‘opinions of our sister signatories’ . . . 
are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”174 In Lawrence v. Texas, for 
example, the Supreme Court cited to the European Court of 
Human Rights in deciding to overturn its decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.175 Foreign case law has also been cited extensively in 
cases concerning capital punishment. In Roper v. Simmons, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “the Court has referred to the 
laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”176 In particular, 
the Court relied heavily on the experience of the United 
Kingdom, suggesting that the “historic ties between our 
countries” shed significant light on the issue.177 As such, it is not 
unheard of or abnormal for adjudicators to look toward foreign 
 
standpoint, Marouf contends that foreign authorities must be included in legal 
arguments to encourage states to “[E]ngage in a productive dialogue and seek 
to persuade one another about how to interpret various provisions of 
[international human rights treaties].” Id. at 483–84. By including 
international human rights arguments in asylum claims, practitioners can 
facilitate the adoption of a shared understanding of international human rights 
law by those countries that are bound to follow it. 
 173. See id. at 480–84. 
 174. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. 
v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)). 
 175. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). In Bowers, the 
Supreme Court held that a Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the 
fundamental rights of homosexuals. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 
(1986). The European Court of Human Rights overturned a statute similar to 
the one in Bowers, though it did not cite Bowers itself. See P.G. & J.H. v. United 
Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 195, App. No. 00044787/98, para.56. 
 176. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 177. Id. at 577. 
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court interpretations of treaties or legal doctrine relevant to the 
case at hand in interpreting United States domestic law. 
Unfortunately, the BIA and federal courts only rarely defer 
to foreign interpretations of the Refugee Convention or the 1967 
Protocol in their adjudications.178 For example, in a concurring 
opinion in Matter of Kasinga, Judge Rosenberg cited Canadian 
case law to support her argument that gender-based asylum 
claims are becoming internationally recognized.179 And in his 
concurrence in Negusie v. Holder, Justice Stevens cited cases 
from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
to support his interpretation of the persecutor bar.180 These 
cases suggest that some judges may find foreign authorities at 
least mildly persuasive. Unfortunately, these cases represent an 
exception, not the rule. Instead, these courts typically prefer 
traditional rules and canons of statutory interpretation to the 
Refugee Act, thereby “ignoring the incorporated treaty.”181 
Immigration agencies within DHS—mainly USCIS and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)—may be more 
likely to consider foreign authorities than the courts. Asylum 
officers are trained to evaluate gender-based asylum claims 
using international cases and guidelines published by countries 
such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.182 In its 
Matter of L-R- brief, DHS cited to the Canadian Guidelines on 
Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 
in support of recognizing asylum claims from domestic violence-
based particular social groups.183 DHS’s and USCIS’s use of 
foreign case law and agency sources suggests that immigration 
 
 178. Professor Marouf acknowledges that “[i]n very rare cases, U.S. Courts 
of Appeals have mentioned foreign authority in analyzing the Refugee Act, but 
such references are made in passing, often as a footnote, unhinged from the 
principled approach to treaty interpretation.” Marouf, supra note 172, 418–19 
(emphasis omitted). 
 179. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 377. 
 180. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1175 n.7 (2009) (citing Canada v. 
Asghedom [2001] F.C.T. 972 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Gurung v. Secretary of State for 
Home Dept., [200] UKAIT 4870 (U.K.Immigr.App.Trib.); SRYYY v. Minister for 
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, [2005] 147 F.C.R. 1 
(Austl.Fed.Ct.); Refugee Appeal No. 2142/94 (N.Z. Refugee Status App. Auth., 
Mar. 20, 1997)). 
 181. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 393. 
 182. Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note 94, 
at 7–9. 
 183. Brief for Department of Homeland Security at 13 n.10, Matter of L-R- 
(filed Apr. 13, 2009), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-
asylum-brief.pdf. 
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agencies under DHS are more likely to accept arguments based 
on foreign case law than federal courts or IJs. 
Practitioners should incorporate foreign authorities into 
their international human rights arguments, but must do so 
tactfully. As mentioned above, an increased offering of foreign 
case law may cause United States Courts to further eschew 
foreign authorities.184 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein 
have proposed three factors to be considered when selecting 
foreign authorities. First, the foreign authority must “reflect a 
judgment based on that state’s private information about how 
some question is best answered.”185 Second, the issue discussed 
in the foreign authority must be similar to the problem before 
the interpreting court.186 Third, the foreign authority must be an 
“independent judgment,” and not merely the result of an 
emerging jurisprudential trend.187 
Professor Fatma Marouf provides an analysis of how these 
criteria may be applied to foreign authorities interpreting the 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.188 First, the foreign 
authority should offer something not available to United States 
adjudicators, primarily that “the foreign state’s interpretation of 
the Protocol should stem from the local knowledge provided by 
actual asylum cases that have been decided by the state’s 
government.”189 Second, the authority should “address a 
 
 184. See Stephen Meili, When Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum 
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 185. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. 
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 188. See Marouf, supra note 172, at 452–72. 
 189. Id. at 454. 
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question similar to the one before the domestic court and share 
a common general understanding of the concept involved.”190 
Third, the foreign state must “exercise independent judgment in 
its interpretation.”191 As such, practitioners should be wary of 
European Union states with less developed asylum systems and 
those states which blindly adopt UNHCR guidelines without 
independent investigation.192 In addition to these three criteria, 
Marouf suggests that the following six factors are important in 
determining how much weight to accord foreign authorities: 
 
(1) whether the foreign state is “specially affected” 
by asylum applications; 
(2) whether the foreign state has a well-developed 
body of asylum law, through jurisprudence or 
legislation; 
(3) the persuasiveness of the foreign state’s 
interpretation; 
(4) the precedential value of the foreign authority; 
(5) whether a given interpretation can be 
consistently applied; and 
(6) whether the interpretation reflects the human 
rights principles underlying the treaty.193 
 
As an example, United States practitioners could use Islam 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department in international 
human rights arguments exploring foreign case law.194 In Islam, 
the United Kingdom’s House of Lords granted asylum to a 
Pakistani woman fleeing domestic violence. The House of Lords 
began its discussion by explaining its interpretation of 
“particular social group” using United States cases, most notably 
Matter of Acosta.195 Citing Acosta, the court stated that a 
common immutable characteristic “might be an innate one ‘such 
as sex, color, or kinship ties.’”196 “This reasoning covers 
Pakistani women because they are discriminated against and as 
 
 190. Id. at 457. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 457–58. 
 194. Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 2 WLR 
1015 (HL) (UK). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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a group they are unprotected by the state.”197 In addition, the 
court suggested that it would have accepted a more narrow 
group definition formulated by “[t]he unifying characteristics of 
gender, suspicion of adultery, and lack of protection.”   
Islam offers an example of a case that fits Marouf’s criteria. 
The United Kingdom asylum system is robust, well-developed, 
and uses the Acosta standard for particular social group 
determinations.198 Since Islam cites United States law so heavily 
it is more likely to persuade U.S. adjudicators because the case 
is founded on law that is binding on U.S. adjudicators. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom has a large population of 
refugees.199 Overall, the case is well-argued and advances a 
position only recently recognized in the United States. Marouf’s 
criteria suggest that Islam would be an ideal case to include 
when making International Human Rights arguments in a 
domestic violence-based asylum claim. 
Practitioners may carefully incorporate foreign case law and 
treaty interpretations into their arguments to buttress asylum 
claims using the criteria advanced by Marouf to select cases that 
are likely to be accepted by United States adjudicators. The 
inclusion of these authorities benefits the individual asylum 
applicant, and legitimizes the overall United States asylum 
system. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ARGUMENTS IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATIONS 
The preceding analysis reveals the many sources of 
international human rights law practitioners can and should use 
to bolster their asylum arguments and argue for favorable 
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interpretations of the definition of “refugee.” This section will 
use two hypothetical fact patterns to construct international 
human rights arguments based on the information provided in 
Parts I, II, and III. Both hypotheticals present claims that have 
not been resolved by the BIA or the federal courts as of early 
2016. Part A evaluates the asylum claim of Ana, a Salvadoran 
woman seeking protection from her abusive boyfriend, while 
Part B examines the case of Santiago, a fourteen-year-old 
Salvadoran youth seeking asylum due to gang recruitment. 
These cases present novel arguments for resolving similar 
claims. 
A. ANA: A SALVADORAN WOMAN SEEKING PROTECTION FROM 
HER ABUSIVE BOYFRIEND 
1. Facts 
Ana is a twenty-five-year-old woman fleeing her abusive 
boyfriend, Alberto, in El Salvador. She and Alberto met three 
years ago and moved in together shortly thereafter. According to 
Ana, Alberto was a member of the MS-13 gang and a habitual 
drunk. Ana originally became Alberto’s girlfriend out of fear that 
members of the MS-13 gang would kill her if she refused. Alberto 
frequently beat Ana with his fists. Once, while Alberto was 
drunk, he shot at Ana with a pistol; the bullet grazed her hip. 
Ana fled the house and went to the police, who laughed at Ana, 
refused to file the report, and called Alberto to pick her up. After 
picking her up, Alberto beat Ana unconscious. The next morning, 
Ana fled to the United States with the help of her uncle. Ana is 
filing for asylum as a member of the particular social group: 
“Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their relationship.” 
200 
2. Using International Human Rights Arguments in Ana’s 
Case 
International law recognizes domestic violence as a form of 
persecution. In its guidelines, the UNHCR declared that 
 
 200. The proposed particular social group of this hypothetical is 
substantially similar to Matter of A-R-C-G-. See 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 
2014). The facts have been altered to provide a more novel discussion of the 
hypothetical claim. 
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“domestic violence . . . [is an act] which inflict[s] severe pain and 
suffering—both mental and physical—and which ha[s] been 
used as [a] form[] of persecution, whether perpetrated by State or 
private actors.”201 Other international agreements and bodies 
similarly recognize domestic violence as persecution. In General 
Recommendation No. 32, the CEDAW Committee interpreted 
“persecution” under the Refugee Convention to include “serious 
forms of domestic violence.”202 The United Kingdom has 
accepted this interpretation in its case law.203 Using these 
arguments, it can be reasoned that Ana suffered “persecution” 
under the Refugee Convention in the form of domestic violence. 
Some courts may be hesitant to recognize a claim stemming 
from cohabitation alone (i.e. when the victim was not married to 
his or her persecutor). However, international human rights 
treaties speak of the need for states to respect and enforce 
equality between men and women—not just spouses.204 For 
example, CEDAW states that women have a right to 
“fundamental freedoms”—including freedom from domestic 
violence—”irrespective of their marital status.”205 Therefore, 
domestic violence includes violence between men and women 
living together—regardless of the legal recognition of their 
relationship. As Ana and Alberto cohabitate, Alberto’s violence 
against Ana constitutes persecution. Ana does not need to show 
a marital relationship in order to establish persecution or to 
show that she is unable to leave her relationship for purposes of 
her particular social group. 
   
 
 201. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution, 
supra note 101, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 202. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 32, supra note 115, at para. 15. 
 203. See, e.g., Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 
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 204. See generally ICCPR, supra note 139, art. 3 (“The States Parties to the 
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”); 
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B. SANTIAGO: A FOURTEEN-YEAR-OLD SALVADORAN YOUTH 
SEEKING ASYLUM DUE TO FORCED GANG RECRUITMENT. 
1. Facts 
Santiago is a fourteen-year-old Salvadoran youth seeking 
asylum based on MS-13 gang recruitment. One day in October, 
Xavier, a member of the MS-13 gang, approached Santiago while 
he was on his way to school and demanded that he join the gang. 
Santiago knew Xavier was a member of the MS-13 gang because 
of his facial tattoos. Santiago refused to join the gang, telling 
Xavier he wanted to continue going to school. Xavier proceeded 
to beat Santiago with a pistol and rob him of his belongings. 
From October to December, Xavier followed Santiago to school 
and threatened to kill him if he did not join the gang. Finally, 
Xavier and three other gang members kidnapped Santiago, tied 
him up, and poured gasoline on him. Santiago was able to escape 
and eventually fled to the United States. Santiago is filing for 
asylum as a member of the particular social group: “Salvadoran 
youth who oppose gang recruitment.”206 
2. Using International Human Rights Arguments in 
Santiago’s Case 
As a child seeking asylum, Santiago is entitled to 
heightened protections under international law. Both the 
UNHCR and the CRC emphasize that in asylum cases, “the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”207 In 
determining the “best of interests of the child,” asylum 
adjudicators must consider “their age, their level of maturity and 
development and their dependency on adults,” as well as “child 
specific rights.”208 These child specific rights include, among 
others, protection from violence, protection from under-age 
recruitment, and the right to education.209 MS-13, and the El 
 
 206. The proposed particular social group of this hypothetical is 
substantially similar to Matter of S-E-G-. See 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). 
The facts have been altered to provide a more novel discussion of the 
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 207. CRC, supra note 127, art. 3(1); accord Guidelines on International 
Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra note 109, at 4. 
 208. See Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra 
note 109, at 3–4. 
 209. Id. at 8. 
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Salvador government, violated all three of Santiago’s 
fundamental rights. The Court and asylum officer must evaluate 
Santiago’s claim in light of these denials of basic human rights 
coupled with his age. 
Furthermore, the UNHCR has concluded that the “agent of 
persecution,” or “non-State actor,” can be a “criminal gang[]” for 
the purposes of asylum:210 
Where children are singled out as a target group for 
recruitment or use by an armed force or group, they may 
form a particular social group due to the innate and 
unchangeable nature of their age as well as the fact that 
they are perceived as a group by the society in which they 
live . . . .[A] child who . . . refuses to become associated 
with an armed force may be perceived as holding a 
political opinion in which case the link to the Convention 
ground of political opinion may also be established. 211 
The CRC reinforces that a gang—as an armed group—can be an 
agent of persecution. CRC Article 38 suggests that states have 
an obligation under international law to prevent forced 
recruitment of children by armed groups.212 El Salvador, as a 
signatory of the CRC, has failed to protect children from gang 
recruitment. As the MS-13 gang targeted Santiago for 
recruitment, Santiago suffered persecution by a non-State actor. 
In addition, Santiago’s particular social group, “Salvadoran 
youth who oppose gang recruitment,” is socially distinct and 
particular under international understandings of these terms. 
The UNHCR emphasizes that age, and in particular “youth,” is 
immutable, particular, and socially distinct.213 According to the 
UNCHR guidelines: 
[B]eing a child is in effect an immutable characteristic at 
any given point in time. A child is clearly unable to 
disassociate him/herself from his/her age in order to 
avoid the persecution feared. The fact that the child 
eventually will grow older is irrelevant to the 
identification of a particular social group . . . .Being a 
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child is directly relevant to one’s identity, both in the eyes 
of society and from the perspective of the individual 
child . . . .In most societies, children are set apart from 
adults as they are understood to require special attention 
or care, and they are referred to by a range of descriptors 
used to identify or label them, such as “young,” “infant,” 
“child,” “boy,” “girl,” or “adolescent.” The identification of 
social groups also may be assisted by the fact that the 
children share a common socially-constructed 
experience, such as being abused, abandoned 
impoverished or internally displaced.214 
The United Kingdom recognizes that although an applicant “will 
in due course cease to be a child, he is immutably a child at the 
time of assessment.”215 As Santiago was a child at the time of 
filing, “youth” constitutes an immutable and particularly-
defined characteristic. Furthermore, the UNHCR interprets 
social visibility to encompass gang recruitment of children.216 As 
discussed above, Article 38 of the CRC reinforces that forced 
recruitment is socially recognizable in countries in which it is an 
issue.217 Therefore, “Salvadoran youth who oppose gang 
recruitment” meets the criteria of immutability, particularity, 
and social distinction when these terms are interpreted using 
international understandings of these terms. 
Both Ana and Santiago’s cases utilize international human 
rights arguments in emerging types of asylum claims. Although 
international human rights law is only persuasive authority, 
these types of arguments bolster their claims by demonstrating 
to the adjudicator that international law generally favors 
protection of these individuals. The use of international human 
rights arguments is not limited to cases of domestic violence or 
gang recruitment. Practitioners should carefully examine their 
cases to see if international human rights arguments would 
assist the adjudicator in more readily finding a “particular social 
group” or “persecution.” 
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Conclusion 
International sources such as the UNHCR handbook, 
international human rights treaties, and foreign case law offer 
interpretations of the 1980 Refugee Act’s more ambiguous 
terms—particularly “particular social group” and “persecution.” 
These interpretations aid in asylum claims—such as child 
asylum claims or those founded on domestic violence—that have 
yet to be fully explored in the United States. Without context, 
adjudicators may have a difficult time understanding why an 
asylum applicant’s claim articulates a particular social group or 
persecution. International human rights treaties provide 
practitioners with support for unique and persuasive arguments 
to buttress their clients’ asylum claims. Reliance on 
international human rights law is almost necessary whenever 
approaching a case unfamiliar to U.S. immigration officials. New 
refugee crises bring new forms of persecution and particular 
social groups, all of which the adjudicator must assess under the 
1980 Refugee Act. 
From an overarching policy standpoint, the use of 
international human rights law arguments serves a greater 
purpose. As asylum adjudicators begin to see increased usage of 
international law, they may become more comfortable relying on 
UNHCR interpretations, treaties, and sister signatories’ 
interpretations of those treaties. Adjudicators will hopefully 
adapt and more readily entertain these sorts of arguments. 
Thus, the use of international human rights law is not only 
beneficial for advocating on behalf of the individual client, but 
for establishing a healthy and safe immigration system for 
refugees as a whole. 
